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11Abstract Studying how collaborative activity takes shape interactionally in the con-
12text of technological settings is one of the main challenges in the field of Computer-
13Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL). It requires us, amongst other things, to
14look into the ‘black box’ of how technical artifacts are brought into use, or rather,
15how they are attuned to, interacted with, and shaped in various and varied practices.
16This article explores the establishment of a purposeful connection of human agents
17and technical artifacts in CSCL, that we call ‘the agent-artifact connection’. In order
18to contribute to a grounded conception of this connection, we reviewed three
19theoretical positions: affordance, structures and instrument. Although these three
20positions differ in how they conceptualise the connection, they share the assumption
21that a technical artifact carries a potential for action that becomes available when
22artifact and agent connect, and that the availability of action opportunities is relative
23to the ones who interact with the artifact. In this article, we map out the conceptual
24and methodological implications for each of the positions. We argue that the rationale
25of ‘shaping’ collaborative interactions that underlies a part of CSCL research should
26be replaced by a rationale of ‘mutual shaping’ of human agents and technical
27artifacts.
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30InQ5 troduction
31The main focus in the CSCL research community is on how people learn in the context of
32collaborative activity and how technological settings that support this activity can be
33designed and evaluated. The rationale that often - implicitly - underlies such support is as
34follows: a technical artifact imposes certain constraints and makes a range of action
35opportunities available to a group of learners. Use of the artifact within a script or ‘scenario’
36shapes collaborative interactions between the learners according to the designers’ intentions
37(Baker and Lund 1997; Jermann and Dillenbourg 2003; Kollar et al. 2006; Fischer et al.
382007). This rationale of ‘shaping’ collaborative interactions may suggest that the effects of a
39technical artifact on collaboration could be predicted rather straightforwardly, and that
40learners could readily engage in more productive interactions. However, it would be an
41oversimplification to speak of ‘effects’ or ‘properties’ of a technical artifact, as if these are
42stable characteristics that are generalizable over different groups or settings. Enactment of a
43script is always to some extent unpredictable (Dillenbourg and Tchounikine 2007) and
44artifacts can be appropriated in unexpected ways (Overdijk and Van Diggelen 2008; Dwyer
45and Suthers 2006). It is important to realise that the design of technological settings can only
46be indirect, in the sense that technological settings establish preconditions for educational
47opportunities, but do not causally determine those activities, or their attendant learning
48outcomes (Oliver 2011; Stahl and Hesse 2006; Jones et al. 2006). Studying how collabora-
49tive activity takes shape interactionally in the context of these technological settings is one of
50the main challenges in the field. It requires us to look into the ‘black box’ of how technical
51artifacts are brought into use by learners, or rather, how they are attuned to, interacted with,
52and shaped in various and varied practices.
53In its general definition, technology refers to ensembles of technical artifacts, activities or
54processes, and practical knowledge (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). Educational technol-
55ogy, following this definition, is a composite entity that consists of learner(s) and artifact(s)
56as instantiated in the learning activity. It does not exist independent of its use (LeBaron
572002). Rather, it is constructed in activities where learners orient themselves to, and make
58sense of the tools and artifacts they are presented with (Stahl et al. 2006). Educational
59technology, thus, emerges from an interaction of learners and technical artifacts and is
60shaped by both. Following this line of reasoning, the rationale of ‘shaping’ collaborative
61interactions that underlies a part of CSCL research should be replaced by a rationale of
62‘mutual shaping’ of agent and artifact. In order to arrive at a grounded conception of what
63we call ‘the agent-artifact connection’, as several people have already argued in this field of
64research (e.g., Oliver 2011; Bonderup Dohn 2009; Overdijk and Van Diggelen 2008; Jones
65et al. 2006), it is necessary to investigate theoretical issues and refine theoretical perspectives
66about this connection, specific to our field (Stahl and Hesse 2006, 2010).
67A relational perspective
68A relation is an emergent property of the interaction of two or more parts in a system that
69connects these parts as being and working together. A relational perspective on technology
70specifies the nature of such a ‘functional’ connection of human agents and technical artifacts.
71It specifies, for example, how a purposeful connection between agent and artifact is
72established, and how this connection is managed among multiple agents. In this article we
73review three positions that concern this connection of technical artifacts and the people who
74use them. These positions adhere to distinct strands of theory, namely affordances (Gibson
751979), structuration theory (Giddens 1986), and instrumental genesis (Rabardel 1995). Each
M. Overdijk et al.
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76of these positions has gained considerable influence in studies of computer-supported
77collaborative learning, sometimes through reworking of original concepts. Although the
78three positions differ from each other in how they conceptualise the agent-artifact connec-
79tion, they share the assumption that a technical artifact carries a potential for action that
80becomes available when the artifact and the human agent connect, and that the availability of
81action opportunities is relative to the needs, abilities or intentions of the one(s) who interact
82(s) with the artifact. Each of the three positions awards some degree of influence to both
83agent and artifact in how their connection takes shape.
84We map out for each of the positions - affordance, structures and instrument - some
85conceptual and methodological implications for studying collaboration in technological
86settings. Our review is driven by the following questions: to what extent do these positions
87allow us to describe how the agent-artifact connection is established and managed in
88collaborative activity? And to what extent do they allow us to describe a mutual shaping -
89the establishment of the connection wherein both agent and artifact have an influence? It is
90our aim to contribute to the debate as it takes shape in our community (Oliver 2011;
91Bonderup Dohn 2009; Overdijk and Van Diggelen 2008; Jones et al. 2006; Dwyer and
92Suthers 2006; Suthers 2006; LeBaron 2002) by drawing up parallels between the positions
93of affordance, structures and instrument. Our review of the individual positions is therefore
94concise. Throughout our discussion we use observations from a specific case study - of how
95a multi-user workspace was brought into use in a collaborative planning activity - as a
96reference to illustrate our points.
97Making a project plan in a shared workspace
98The planning case was carried out within a secondary vocational school, with a class of
99students at third year level (in a 4-year program), aged 14–15 (Overdijk 2009). Over
100the duration of the school year these students had to work on several projects, in
101groups of three. With each project the students were presented with a syllabus that
102contained a series of assignments. At the start of their project they were expected to
103construct a plan that would describe in detail for each day of the project the tasks that
104had to be carried out. The students were accustomed to first study the assignments in
105the syllabus, sketch out an initial plan with paper and pen, and then draw up a final
106plan in a computer program - either on a spreadsheet or word processor. Some groups,
107as a convention, contributed simultaneously to the paper and pen representation of their
108project plan, while others took turns, or worked from a distribution of roles whereby
109one of them would manipulate the artifact, and the others would comment and
110contribute to the discussion. For this study, the groups were invited to construct their
111project plan in a shared workspace called Digalo (described in the next section, see also
112e.g. Muller Mirza et al. 2007). The students had no prior experience with this type of
113workspace technology, and they were provided with limited instructions. Their experi-
114ence with online synchronous interaction pertained mostly to chat. First, we observed
115the ‘regular’ planning activity whereby we made field notes in the classroom and
116collected the final project plans. Then we observed how the shared workspace was
117brought into use in the activity, whereby the system logged all interaction data.
118In our experience, this case is exemplary for the type of intervention that is common in
119CSCL: a technical artifact is introduced in a classroom and learners are invited to bring the
120artifact into use in the learning activity. Their utilization of the artifact takes place against the
121background of how they would ‘normally’ do things, that is, without the computer support.
122The artifact is embedded in a script that specifies instructions but there’s no single best way
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning
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123of doing things. The students have to make sense of the artifact they are presented with and
124jointly organize a productive use.
125Affordance
126The first strand of theory that we review centres on the concept of affordance (originally
127formulated in Gibson 1979; later interpreted and reworked most famously in Norman 1988,
1281999; and also, for example, Gaver 1991, 1996; Hartson 2003; Chemero 2003; Turner
1292005). The concept of affordance proposes that surfaces in the material environment embody
130specific opportunities for action that become available to the acting agent. These opportu-
131nities enable a functional coupling between the agent and his or her environment. The
132affordance, in the context of ecological perception in which it was initially developed,
133describes the way in which an animal picks up information from the environment as it
134moves through its natural surroundings. Later, the concept of affordance was extended to
135describe interactions with everyday cultural artifacts, such as the computer (Norman 1988,
1361999). The notion of ‘technology affordance’ (Gaver 1991), understood as a dispositional
137action opportunity in technological settings, underlies several studies in CSCL research (e.g.
138Suthers 2006; Kirschner et al. 2004). But to what extent is the idea of (technology)
139affordance actually useful in explaining the agent-artifact connection in collaborative activ-
140ity? We first turn briefly to affordance as it was originally formulated by Gibson (1979),
141reviewing some of the critiques that have been posited against it (see for example Turner
1422005; Rappert 2003; Hutchby 2001), and then reflect briefly on technology affordance in its
143basic form (Norman 1988, 1999).
144The basic definition of affordance is familiar to many in the CSCL community. Still, it
145serves our purpose to provide a brief but precise reading of the original concept. The
146affordance of an object refers to the opportunities for action carried by this object in relation
147to the perceiver of the object. The affordance is relational: it is seen as a property of the
148connection of the agent and the object. As such, as Gibson (1979) points out, it is both
149environmental and behavioural, both physical and psychical, but it cannot be reduced to
150either of these constitutive parts. This relational nature of affordance is grounded in five
151premises. The opportunities for action that become available through some object in the
152environment to some agent are relative to the needs of that agent (premise 1). An object
153reflects certain opportunities for action to one agent, while another agent may perceive other
154opportunities, depending on his or her needs. The concept of affordance is based on
155principles of direct perception. The information that is available through affordances is
156directly available to the perceiver, and is not based on any higher-level cognitive processing
157(premise 2). There is, in other words, no interpretation or mediation by symbols or rules
158involved in the perception of an affordance. Instead, the functional coupling of agent and
159object is ‘natural’, and governed by ecological laws (Shaw 2003) (premise 3). Moreover,
160affordances are not only directly perceived, they are also translated non-reflectively into
161action through what is called the ‘perception-action loop’ (premise 4). Finally, affordances
162are perceptual ‘invariants’, that is, they are fixed properties of the perceived stimulus
163(premise 5). Gibson emphasises this fixed nature by stating that “The affordance of some-
164thing does not change as the need of the observer changes. The observer may or may not
165perceive or attend to the affordance, according to his needs, but the affordance, being
166invariant, is always there to be perceived” (Gibson 1979, p. 139). What may be perceived
167by the agent, in other words, remains unchanged, whether the agent perceives it or not.
168Turner (2005) summarises: “An affordance thus exists, whether it is perceived or used or
M. Overdijk et al.
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169not, furthermore it may be detected and used without explicit awareness of doing so”
170(p. 790).
171In its original form, “affordance” is a thought-provoking concept that helps to create
172sensitivity with respect to the complexity of the agent-artifact connection. However, in this
173form, it has also limitations (e.g. Stoffregen 2004; Shaw 2003) and is not, for example,
174tailored to understanding collaboration in technological settings. To illustrate this, let us
175consider the introduction of the shared workspace in the planning activity.
176The shared workspace (Fig. 1) is a multi-user platform designed to support joint activity
177in face-to-face settings. The members of a group sit around a table, each behind his or her
178own workstation - preferably a lap- or tabletop - and manipulate a shared representation on
179screen, while they can also communicate (non) verbally. The three main features of the
180workspace are a drawing space, a notation scheme that supports specific communicative
181acts, and simultaneous access. A participant selects a contribution card from the notation
182scheme and adds it to the drawing space. That participant can then add a textual label to the
183title space of that card. By double-clicking on the card a comment window appears, where
184the contribution can be further elaborated. Participants can produce contributions to the
185drawing space in parallel. Cards that are placed in the drawing space can be linked to other
186cards. For the planning case, the notation scheme was designed to specify parts of the plan,
187that is, tasks, duration and outcome. It also contained a predefined time structure: ten
188columns representing the 10 days of the project.
189The shared workspace allowed the groups to jointly construct a representation of their
190plan in the drawing space, and to discuss this plan face-to-face as well. In terms of
191affordances, the workspace made certain action opportunities available. For example, it
192allowed contributions to the drawing space to be made simultaneously. Group members,
193however, could also contribute by taking turns. Whether or not the students perceived and
Fig. 1 Shared workspace with notation scheme and first three of the predefined columns
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning
JrnlID 11412_ArtID 9143_Proof# 1 - 10/03/2012
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
194used the opportunity to contribute simultaneously to the drawing space - ‘the affordance of
195simultaneity’ - depended not only on the opportunity being there but also on the students’
196expectations and experiences with previous collaborations. Some students in our case
197perceived and used the opportunity to contribute to the workspace by taking turns. Others
198assigned the role of typing and submitting contributions to one of the group members, while
199the others refrained themselves from contributing to the workspace directly. For some
200groups, these enactments were in fact near to their ‘regular’ way of plan construction, that
201is, with a sheet of paper and a pen. In other words, the opportunities for collaboration that
202became available via the workspace, those that were perceived and used, were relative to the
203students that work with it - within the set of constraints that were produced by the
204workspace.
205So far so good. But can it be said that the opportunities that were enacted by the
206students were also directly perceived by them? This is difficult to determine from our
207observations. What we can establish, however, is that the action opportunities were not
208translated non-reflectively into action. Not in all cases anyway. The workspace is a flexible
209artifact whereby multiple opportunities may coexist at a given time. Collaboration in the
210workspace, therefore, requires a certain degree of coordination. Our observations, like
211other studies of similar workspaces (e.g.Q6 Baker et al. 2012; Overdijk and Van Diggelen
2122008), point out that some groups go through a phase of negotiation in order to arrive at
213some shared convention on how to utilize the artifact. Thereby it is possible and some-
214times likely that certain ways of doing - such as a specific distribution of roles between
215group members - are transposed. This does not appear to be a matter of ecological law but
216rather one of cultural rule or convention.
217Critiquing Gibson’s notion of affordance
218In thinking of Gibson’s theory of affordance two questions come to mind. If affordances are
219directly perceived and realised in action, without mental representation, how do the con-
220ventions and rules that govern human activity tie in? How does a rule become a rule?
221Furthermore, if affordances are directly perceived, although they may provide different
222action opportunities to different participants in the activity, how is an effective realisation
223of opportunities achieved and coordinated? Both questions concern the way in which
224affordances are related to the social and cultural context in which artifacts are brought into
225use. Although we may assume a generally shared frame of reference in the use of such
226everyday things as a hammer or a chair, in other cases such a shared frame of reference
227cannot be assumed (Rappert 2003). Many artifacts that we find in technological settings for
228collaboration cannot be considered as everyday things: they are highly complex artifacts
229whose use is more often than not far from intuitive. Moreover, they are multi-user objects
230whereby usage requires a high degree of mutual attunement with others who are using the
231object at the same time. This kind of interaction is tied in with rules and conventions. These
232rules and conventions are the ‘glue’ of activity. They allow for the construction of shared
233meanings and the transposition of certain behaviours from one task-artifact configuration to
234the next. What if, as occasionally happened in our case of plan construction, group members
235perceive divergent opportunities? What if one group member perceives the opportunity to
236contribute simultaneously to the drawing space, a second perceives the opportunity to take
237turns, and a third perceives the opportunity to distribute roles? The three students will have
238to reflect on and negotiate their utilisation of the workspace in order to collaborate.
239Affordances, however, neither account for the role of rules and conventions in how artifacts
240are used, nor for the possibility to reflect on them (Shaw 2003; Rappert 2003; Dant 2005).
M. Overdijk et al.
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241Therefore, a purposeful connection of agents and artifacts in collaborative activity cannot be
242explained solely by Gibsonian affordances.
243‘Socialising’ affordances
244In response to this problem, authors have taken up the notion of affordance beyond ‘the
245classic Gibsonian perception-action loop’ (Turner 2005). Reworkings of the concept attempt
246to ‘socialise’ affordances (e.g. Costall 1995; Norman 1999; Hutchby 2001) so that they can
247account for cultural variability, reflexive behaviours and the generalisation of ways of doing.
248The best-known reworking of affordance in the context of technology is that of Norman
249(1988, 1999). The central idea in his project is that of a “system image” that is made visible
250in the physical structures of the technical artifact. Through interaction with the artifact, the
251system image translates into a mental model (1988). Principles of direct perception are
252hereby combined with those of indirect perception. This combination of direct and indirect
253perception is achieved through a distinction between perceived and real affordances
254(Norman 1999). The real affordance is the direct, unlearned affordance, as proposed by
255Gibson. The perceived affordance is “often more about conventions than about reality”
256(Norman, p. 124). Other authors have proposed this kind of ‘socialisation’ of affordance.
257Costall (1995) and Hutchby (2001), for example, include the possibility of learning affor-
258dances from others and of designing them into everyday objects, thus pulling affordance out
259of the natural and into the cultural realm. To what extent is the original affordance or it’s
260reworking useful for studying collaboration in technological settings?
261Affordances and agency
262In the preceding we have identified five premises that adhere to the relational nature of
263Gibson’s theory of affordance: 1) its possible use is relative to the needs of the perceiver; 2)
264its information is directly available to the perceiver, and is not based on any higher-level
265cognitive processing; 3) its coupling with the agent is ‘natural’, and governed by ecological
266laws; 4) it is translated non-reflectively into action, and 5) it is a fixed property of the
267perceived stimulus. Although the perception of an action opportunity is relative to - either
268the ecology or culture of - the agent, the effect of the affordance on behaviour is inherent to
269the artifact and independent of the behaviour itself. The actions of the agent are, in other
270words, ‘directed’ by the affordances that become available via the artifact. This tends
271towards a stance of technological determinism, and underrates reflective and creative
272agency.
273In terms of activity theory, the affordance explains the agent-artifact connection on the
274level of operations (Baerentsen and Trettvik 2002). Here, ‘operations’ are understood as
275nonconscious and driven by conditions of the action at hand (Leont’ev 1978). This counts
276for situations wherein agents act non-reflectively and where the interaction between agent
277and artifact is (or has become) transparent, such as when a button is pushed intuitively to
278perform some function, or when a set of routinized manipulations are performed on an
279interface. This does not cover all possible situations. As we pointed out, it does not account
280for the coordination of action between multiple agents, and it does not explain how ‘ways of
281doing’ are transposed from one context to another.
282Does the ‘socialised’, representational extension of affordance provide a viable alterna-
283tive? The extension combines the principles of direct perception with those of indirect
284perception, in this way allowing for reflection and reference to rules and conventions. The
285problem with this is that it creates a conflict with several of the premises that warrant the
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning
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286relational nature of the affordance (i.e. premises 2, 3 and 4). This compromises its explan-
287atory power because it is not evident what the affordance explains if it is not understood as
288part of a direct perception-action loop. One could argue, on the other hand, that the
289‘socialised’ affordances coexist with the Gibsonian affordance, for example by distinguish-
290ing between perceived affordances and real affordances, as Norman does (1999). However,
291then we have to indicate how the principles of direct perception and those of indirect
292perception interoperate - like in activity theory (Leont’ev 1978). And this requires additional
293work.
294Finally, there is also a methodological challenge: affordance is real and perceivable
295(Chemero 2003) but it cannot be reduced to properties of either the artifact or the agent
296(Gibson 1979). It thus becomes a challenge to distinguish empirically influences of either the
297agent or the artifact.
298Structuration
299The second strand of theory that we review originates from sociology, where it was
300developed in the context of the structure-agency debate. This debate centres on the relation
301between human agency and societal structures, whereby the challenge is to account for free
302agency in relation to stability and - experienced - continuity in the reproduction of social
303practices and institutions. Traditionally, societal structures are looked upon as imposing
304constraints on the individual. The influence of societal structures is hereby prioritised over
305human agency. This tendency could lead to determinism. It emphasises the influence of
306society on social actors rather than the power of these actors to influence and change society
307(O’Donnell 2001). One influential attempt to overcome the structure-agency problem in
308sociology is Structuration Theory (Giddens 1986). Like the theory of affordance, structur-
309ation theory adopts a relational position, and like the affordance, derivatives of structuration
310theory have impacted upon technology studies in an attempt to explain the functional
311relation between human agents and technical artifacts (Orlikowski 1992, 2000; DeSanctis
312and Poole 1994; Contractor and Seibold 1993; Gouran 1999; Bansler and Havn 2006).
313Structuration theory explains how agents produce more or less stable social practices over
314time and are able to introduce changes in these practices as well. The theory proposes a
315system wherein social structures are reproduced in an ongoing interaction process of human
316agents and structural features. It attempts to escape a determinist view on human agency on
317the basis of four premises. The duality of structure poses that structures are both medium and
318outcome of the ongoing interaction (premise 1). Structures are seen as a medium for
319interaction in that they enable and constrain action; at the same time they are the outcome
320of that interaction, and are recursively implicated through their reproduction (Giddens 1986).
321Structures in this sense do not refer to physical characteristics of a surface or interface.
322Rather, they are conceived of as a property of the social system (premise 2). They are not
323stable entities and do not exist outside action: structures are constantly being formed and
324reformed in the production and reproduction of practices. Structure exists only “as memory
325traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action” (p. 377).
326An object - a technical artifact - does not contain structures, it contains structural features
327(premise 3). These structural features make rules and resources available. Structures emerge
328from the acting of the agent upon the structural features. Structural features allow “the
329‘binding’ of time-space in social systems [making] it possible for discernibly similar social
330practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and lend them ‘systemic’ form”
331(Giddens 1986, p. 17). Structure is then defined as “rules and resources, recursively
M. Overdijk et al.
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332implicated in the reproduction of social systems” (p. 377). The rules and resources that become
333available are relative to the agent that acts upon the object (premise 4). Rules are defined as
334“generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life” (Giddens 1986,
335p. 21). These rules can be constitutive or regulative. They relate to the constitution of meaning
336(signification) or to the sanctioning of modes of social conduct (legitimation). Rules governing
337signification enable meaningful communication in that they allow the coding and decoding of a
338symbolic order. Rules governing legitimation allow moral sanctioning. Furthermore, two kinds
339of resources are distinguished: authorative resources, which refer to power over people, for
340example physical strength or knowledge, and allocative resources, which refers to control over
341objects in the material world, such as technical artifacts or real estate. Resources are focused in
342practice via the application of rules.
343Virtual structures?
344Structuration theory explains the agent-artifact connection by means of structures. Structures
345- the bindings of rules and resources (as in control over people or objects) - are not tied to a
346specific situation in time or space. They exist only virtually, and may occur in an unprede-
347termined range of situations. In this way they allow for the reproduction and generalization
348of technological practices. In structuration theory, the connection of agent and technical
349artifact emerges with the instantiation of this binding of rules and resources, both of which
350become available in the technological setting. What does this mean concretely? Let us revisit
351our case of plan construction in the shared workspace. Remember that the workspace
352allowed simultaneous contributions to a drawing space, and that taking turns was also
353possible. Remember also that the students had a history of collaborative plan construction
354whereby some groups, as a convention, contributed simultaneously to a paper and pen
355representation of their project plan. In terms of structuration theory, these students deliber-
356ately transposed this convention from the ‘regular’ mode of planning - to contribute
357simultaneously to the plan - to the new technological setting. The convention to contribute
358simultaneously became available as a rule in the new setting, and tied to the available mode
359of control over the drawing space - that is, simultaneous access. This rule/resource set
360established a functional connection between the students and the technical artifact that
361realised a certain potential of the technical artefact, relative to, and in line with the students’
362intentions. The workspace was brought into use by the students through the generalization of
363rules and resources and a subsequent reproduction of structures. As the group members were
364knowledgeable of the rules and resources that were available to them, they were capable of
365fine-tuning their interaction with the artifact and of coordinating their collaboration.
366So far this works for our case. The problem with this conception, however, is the
367understatement of the resistance of the material world and the constraining effect of certain
368objects and artifacts (Turner 1986; Sewell 1992; Parker 2000). Criticism boils down to the
369main premise that underlies the duality of structure, namely that the bindings of rules and
370resources have a virtual existence. Sewell (1992) suggests that virtual rules are not prob-
371lematic. Rules are associated with what Giddens (1986) calls ‘memory traces’, and to what
372Sewell (1992) refers to as ‘schemas or procedures’. These rules or schemas can be gener-
373alised, that is, transposed or extended to other situations. “To say that schemas are virtual is
374to say that they cannot be reduced to their existence in any particular practice or any
375particular location in space and time: they can be actualised in a potentially broad and
376unpredetermined range of situations” (Sewell, p. 8). The problem lies with the resources,
377with the notion of virtual control over objects. Particularly problematic is the category of
378non-human, ‘allocative’ resources that bind human agency to material objects like a hammer
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379or a computer. It is difficult to view such bindings as entirely virtual. Let us return to the case
380of the shared workspace. What if the workspace would physically resist simultaneous
381contribution to the project plan in the drawing space? In fact, the workspace can be
382configured to present a floor-control mechanism that requires group members to take turns
383in the construction of their plan. When the rule to contribute simultaneously becomes
384associated with the available mode of control over the drawing space - in that case, turn-
385taking - a non-functional relation between the students and the technical artifact would be
386established. A feature that requires students to take turns physically resists simultaneous
387participation, regardless of the students’ intentions. When the artifact is configured in this
388way, simultaneous access as a mode of control over the workspace is simply not available. It
389is not hard to think of other examples where technical artifacts physically resist certain
390operations by its users. Control over an artifact is an outcome of social structures only up to
391certain limits. According to Sewell, the notion of structure is in contradiction with itself: “If
392structures are virtual, they cannot include both schemas and resources. And if they include
393both schemas and resources, they cannot be virtual” (p. 10–11). Sewell concludes that
394structure could be seen as “composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual, and
395of resources, which are actual” (p. 13).
396Adaptive structuration
397Reworkings of structuration theory have been developed within the organisational sciences,
398where the aim is to account for the connection of human agency and advanced information
399technologies in organizations (the so-called meso-level). It appeared that with the introduc-
400tion of advanced information technologies in these organisational contexts, groups of people
401‘appropriated’ these technologies sometimes in unexpected ways (Orlikowski 1992;
402DeSanctis and Poole 1994). This led DeSanctis and Poole (ibid.) to argue for a position of
403soft line determinism, based on structuration concepts. Adaptive structuration theory
404describes the appropriation of new technology as a process of organisational change that
405is a result of group interaction. “New social structures emerge as the rules and resources of
406the technology are appropriated in a given context and reproduced in group interaction over
407time” (DeSanctis & Poole, p. 129). In this view, structural features that are carried by the
408technical artifact make rules and resources available that are relative to the practice in which
409the technical artifact is introduced. ‘Appropriations’ of a technology are immediate, visible
410actions that evidence how these rules and resources reorganize a practice. Adaptive struc-
411turation deviates from structuration crucially at the point where the coupling of rule-resource
412sets to technical artifacts is explained. In fact, the theory does not explain this coupling.
413Instead, in order to escape a stance of technological voluntarism, DeSanctis and Poole
414(1994) introduced the notion of “spirit”. Technology appropriation is not entirely voluntary,
415but in accordance with the spirit of the technology. Spirit is the general intent with regard to
416the values and goals that underlie a set of structural features (DeSanctis and Poole). Again,
417as with the concept of affordance, the question that arises is to what extent structuration
418theory can be modified in this way without compromising its explanatory power. To what
419extent is the theory of structuration or its reworking fit to explain the connection of agents
420and artifact in the context of collaboration in technological settings?
421Structuration and agency
422Structuration, similar to affordance, reflects a relational position on the connection of agent
423and artifact: an artifact-in-use makes opportunities for action available that are relative to the
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424agent that interacts with the artifact. But this is where the similarity ends. With structuration,
425the agent is ‘knowledgeable’ about rules and resources, and this knowledgeability allows for
426the generalisation of ‘ways of doing’ from one context to another. Furthermore, rules and
427resources are instrumental to the needs of the agent. Structuration proposes a notion of
428agency in which agents display practical and discursive consciousness (Giddens 1986).
429Behaviour is not determined by technical-material structures, and human agents may act
430reflectively and intentionally. Agents may induce changes in the production of structures
431which, when reproduced, become enduring and result in a transformation of their practice.
432As we have discussed, there are some fundamental issues: structuration theory overrates the
433degree of control that people have over material objects and underrates the obduracy of the
434material world. This is a general problem in radical constructivist theories (Hutchby 2001).
435Human agency is there often prioritised over material agency. In doing so, structuration ends
436up at a position of technological voluntarism. The reworking of structuration (DeSanctis and
437Poole 1994) is also problematic. It neglects its main premise, that is, it does not account for
438the duality of structure. It simply bypasses the issue. Although the theory may be useful to
439create a sensibility for the dynamics that are involved in artifact-mediated collaboration, it
440fails to preserve the explanatory power of the original theory.
441In addition, as with affordance, structuration poses a methodological challenge: structures
442do not exist outside action (Giddens 1986) and they can thus only be studied by looking at
443ongoing activities, or rather: processes (Sawyer 2002). This makes it difficult to separate the
444agent and the artifact empirically.
445The instrument
446The third strand of theory that we review is known as the theory of instrumental genesis
447(Rabardel 1995; Rabardel and Bourmaud 2003). Instrumental genesis can be interpreted as a
448branch of activity theory (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006). It addresses the connection of human
449agents and technical artifact(s) through the concept of instrument. An instrument is a
450heterogeneous entity, composed of part technical artifact and part human agent. The
451connection of the agent and the artifact emerges from actions and operations that are
452specified by an activity scheme and performed upon the artifact. The theory proposes a
453generative model wherein a technical artifact becomes an instrument through developmental
454transformations of both the artifact and the people who use it (Rabardel 1995; Rabardel and
455Bourmaud 2003). An instrument can be considered as a functional organ, a mixed unit made
456up of an artifactual component (an artifact, a fraction of an artifact or a group of artifacts) and
457a scheme component (in the Piagetian sense of the term: Piaget 1964), comprising one or
458more associated utilisation schemes that organise the activity. The instrument emerges from
459a ‘double-development movement’, relating to the two components - artifact and utilisation
460scheme: through the application of utilisation schemes agents adapt and give form to the
461artifact, a process called instrumentalisation; through a process called instrumentation the
462utilisation schemes themselves are adapted. As already stated, the double-development
463movement involves adaptations of both the artifact and the utilisation scheme. When an
464agent is presented with an artifact, this artifact is either assimilated in an existing scheme,
465referred to as progressive generalisation, or when there is no suitable scheme available,
466existing schemes are adapted through progressive differentiation (Rabardel 1995). Adapta-
467tions of the artifact can be physical and non-physical. The mechanisms that underlie these
468adaptations are “selection, regrouping, production and institution of functions, deviations
469and catachresis (MO: originally, “the misuse of a word”)” (Rabardel 1995, p. 103).
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470Utilisation schemes
471By developing utilisation schemes agents develop skills and abilities to operate an artifact, to
472decide which tasks should be performed with the artifact, and which methods should be
473applied to perform the task effectively (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006). A certain utilisation
474scheme can be applied to a range of artifacts that belong to the same class. Rabardel (1995)
475gives the example of driving a car. A utilisation scheme that has developed in driving a
476specific type of car can also be utilised to drive other types of cars. This activity scheme may
477be applicable to neighbouring or different classes of artifacts. In the case of driving, for
478example, the utilisation scheme may allow you to drive a whole range of motorised vehicles,
479depending on the similarities and differences with that one type of car (e.g., manual or
480automatic transmission). On the other hand, an artifact is liable to fit into a range of
481utilisation schemes that will attribute it different significations and sometimes different
482functions (Rabardel 1995; Rabardel and Bourmaud 2003). For example, the same car can
483be used for driving on motorways as well as in crowded cities.
484Let us return to our case of plan construction in the shared workspace. Remember that in
485this case the three students could contribute simultaneously to construct their plan in the
486drawing space. Hereto they had to select a card from the notation scheme that was designed
487to specify parts of their plan, and type in their contribution in that card. Remember also that
488the students had no prior experience with this type of workspace technology, and that they
489did have a lot of experience with chat. Possibly due to this experience, it occurred that some
490groups utilised the workspace from a ‘chat-scheme’: they interacted with each other in the
491drawing space through the production of a lot of relatively small contributions at a high pace.
492The students in these groups submitted different types of contributions to the drawing space:
493some of them were related to the content of the project plan, some were related to
494management of the task or social relations. Typically, the larger part of the communication
495took place via the drawing space, while face-to-face communication was limited. In contrast,
496the application of what could be called an ‘argumentation scheme’, a scheme that had
497developed around argumentative activity whereby students talk and listen in turns, lead to
498a relatively small amount of elaborate contributions that were produced at a low pace -
499initially by taking turns, and gradually more parallel. With the application of the ‘chat-
500scheme’ the workspace became a different type of instrument as with the application of the
501‘argumentation scheme’.
502A progressive development
503The process of instrumental genesis is hierarchically organised. Building on activity theory,
504Rabardel and Bourmaud (2003) distinguish three ‘orientations of mediation’: toward the
505artifact itself, toward the object of the activity, and toward other subjects. These orientations
506correspond to three classes of utilisation schemes, representing a ‘nested’ hierarchy. The first
507type, the usage scheme, refers to a scheme that has the artifact itself as object of activity. This
508class of schemes comprises elementary utilisation schemes for handling controls or manip-
509ulating the interface of a technical artifact. Usage schemes constitute specialised modules,
510which, in coordination with other schemes, assimilate and mutually adapt to constitute the
511second type, instrument-mediated action schemes. Instrument-mediated action schemes are
512oriented towards the object of activity for which the artifact is a means of performance; that
513is, towards the goal or motive of the ‘main’ activity. This type of scheme constitutes an
514instrumental act. Finally, instrument-mediated collective activity schemes specify the actions
515of a group of users who share an instrument to fulfil a common motive. This type of scheme
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516incorporates the coordination of individual actions and integration of their results as a
517contribution to common goals.
518Instrumental genesis builds on Leont’ev’s (1978) model of the hierarchical organization of
519activity and on Engeström’s mediational triangle (1987). This allows identification of distinct
520dimensions in the establishment of the agent-artifact connection: non-conscious operations,
521goal-directed actions, as well as personal and collective orientations and rules. In this way,
522utilisation of a technical artifact in collaborative activity can be decomposed and read as a
523progressive development from personal mastery to collective utilisation (Overdijk 2009). Let us
524return once more to our case of plan construction in the shared workspace. The students in our
525case, all first-time users of the workspace, focused initially on the interaction with the work-
526space in order to learn how to manipulate its controls. In activity terms, their action was oriented
527towards manipulating the controls of the workspace, whereby the workspace itself was the
528object of activity and learning how to manipulate its controls was the motive. Once a group
529member mastered basic acts such as selecting a card from the notation scheme, typing a
530contribution in it, and submitting it to the drawing space, his or her attention shifted towards
531the object for which the artifact was a means of performance - that is, plan construction.
532Conscious goal-directed actions at the level of mastery were then transformed into non-
533conscious operations. Subsequently, these routinized basic acts - submitting a specific card
534from the notation with a certain type of contribution - were coupled to a function - for example,
535having this specific card-type to indicate external constraints on the project plan. This utilisation
536of the workspace can be characterized as an enactment of action opportunities aimed at the
537fulfilment of a task-related motive, which makes up a so-called ‘instrumental act’ (Rabardel and
538Bourmaud 2003). Within some groups divergent enactments occurred: for example, group
539members used the notation in different manners such that collaboration was impeded. In these
540groups, the formulation of rules allowed for coordination of the interaction with the artifact - for
541example, having all three students using the same type of card to indicate the same type of
542information, which supported the collaboration.
543Instrument and agency
544The instrument (Rabardel 1995), similar to the affordance and structures, is conceptualised
545as a heterogeneous entity, comprised of a social-behavioural and a technical-material part.
546This heterogeneity allows a relational conception of technology wherein both human agents
547and technical artifact have agentic power. Utilisation schemes allow for the introduction of
548new and creative ways of doing, for the generalisation of ‘ways of doing’ from one task-
549artifact configuration to another, as well as for the management and coordination of artifact-
550mediated activity between multiple agents. Building on Piaget’s work, Rabardel conceptual-
551ises the utilisation scheme as a ‘mental representation for action’ that has both private and
552social dimensions. Utilisation schemes develop in a social context, and in collaborative
553activity they may mutually adapt to form a collective utilisation scheme that coordinates
554individual actions oriented towards a common goal. Instrumental genesis places the primacy
555of action with the human agent: the agent acts upon the artifact from his or her intentions,
556and the artifact becomes ‘instrumental’ to his or her specific needs. In this respect, the theory
557of instrumental genesis is more subject-oriented than the affordance. It suggests, for exam-
558ple, that a technical artifact is ‘merely a proposal’ to the human agent (Rabardel 1995). This
559statement reflects a voluntarism similar to that of structuration theory: it emphasizes human
560agency over technical-material structures. This voluntarism appears to be inconsistent with
561the cognitive constructivism that is evident in the notions of utilisation scheme, scheme
562adaptation and assimilation.
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563From a methodological viewpoint, instrumental genesis describes the agent-artifact
564connection as a hierarchically organised system whereby each level in the hierarchy has
565distinct properties. This allows the connection to be decomposed and analysed accordingly.
566Discussion
567Studying how collaborative activity takes shape interactionally in the context of technolog-
568ical settings requires us to look into the ‘black box’ of how technology is brought into use, or
569rather, how it is attuned to, interacted with, and shaped in various and varied practices. In
570this article we focused on the establishment and coordination of a purposeful connection of
571agents and technical artifacts, what we refer to as ‘the agent-artifact connection’. In order to
572contribute to a theoretically grounded conception of this connection we reviewed three
573relational positions: either through the concept of affordance (Gibson 1979), structures
574(Giddens 1986) or instrument (Rabardel 1995), technology is seen as a heterogeneous entity
575that consists of elements of both agent(s) and artifact. We have considered the implications
576of these relational positions for the study of collaborative learning in technological settings
577and focused on strengths and weaknesses. Our aim was to assess which of the positions
578allows us best to describe the agent-artifact connection in collaborative activity and to what
579extent the positions acknowledge a mutual shaping - the establishment of a connection
580wherein both agent and artifact have an influence. In the concluding part we discuss the main
581findings of our comparative review.
582In a relational view, a technical artifact carries a potential for action that becomes
583available when agent and artifact connect. The availability of specific action opportunities
584is relative to the person(s) who connect(s) with the artifact. But what specific part of the
585human agent are action opportunities relative to? And what governs the realisation of these
586opportunities? In Gibson’s theory of affordance (1979), opportunities for action are relative
587to the agent’s needs. These opportunities are directly perceived, that is, without the agent
588being necessarily aware of some form of internal representation. The affordance theory
589posits that the connection of agent and artifact is ‘natural’ (Shaw 2003). The connection is
590not governed by mental representations or cultural conventions, but by ecological laws. Such
591laws may cover those situations wherein agents interact non-reflectively with the artifacts in
592their ‘natural’ environment. They do not explain how people make choices, or how cultural
593behaviours are appropriated in, reflected upon and transposed over diverse social contexts.
594Nor do they account for the organisation of collaborative behaviour. In addition to any laws
595that may or may not be at work, rules and conventions are crucial to explain the collective
596and cultural dimensions of how artifacts mediate activity (e.g. Miettinen 2001; Engeström
5971999). Both structuration theory and instrumental genesis recognise rules and conventions as
598vehicles for social and cultural organisation of behaviour. These rules and conventions exist
599in cognitive structures that are a part of the agent (either as memory traces or cognitive
600schemas). They mediate activity and can be reflected upon, shared and negotiated. Struc-
601turation theory (Giddens 1986), however, represents a sociological perspective and does not
602specify any cognitive or social psychological aspects of the agent-artifact connection.
603Instrumental genesis, in contrast, allows a detailed analysis of human action through a
604‘nested’ hierarchical model (Rabardel and Bourmaud 2003) based on activity theory
605(Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006; Engeström 1999). This allows the researcher to take learners’
606orientations, motivation and abilities into consideration, which is a prerequisite for most
607CSCL studies. It also allows the researcher to describe the agent-artifact connection as a
608development from personal mastery of the artifact to a collective utilization (Overdijk 2009).
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609Affordances, structures and instruments confer on both agent(s) and artifact some degree
610of agentic power, or agency. Both human agent and artifact have an influence on the nature
611of their connection. But how is this agency distributed? The three positions differ in the
612degree to which they award agentic power to either human agent or artifact. Affordances
613hold that a technical artifact has real properties that exercise an influence on human
614behaviour. Furthermore, they hold that this influence is inherent to the artifact and - although
615its occurrence is relative to the needs of the agent - its nature is essentially independent of the
616behaviour of the agent. With affordances, human agency is downplayed in favour of material
617agency. When applied to technology this tends to lead to a stance of technological deter-
618minism: ‘a displacement of causation from human agency to machines’ (Bijker 1995). With
619structuration theory we find the opposite stance. This theory prioritises human agency over
620material agency. Instead of behaviour being determined by technical-material structures,
621human agents act intentionally and creatively with technology. With the suggestion that
622human agents can control technology according to their intentions, structuration understates
623the real properties of the technical artifact, which reflects a stance of technological volun-
624tarism. A weaker version of such voluntarism can be found with instrumental genesis.
625What are the methodological implications of this? We can contrast the three positions in
626terms of their ontological claims. A process ontology regards the human agent and the tools
627and artifacts in his or her environment as inseparable; the two have no meaning outside
628activity (Sawyer 2002). Human agents and the sociocultural environment within which they
629are situated can only be studied by looking at ongoing activities, or rather: processes. A
630systems perspective, in contrast, describes social reality on various levels of complexity, each
631with its own distinct properties (Van Diggelen 2011). A systems perspective allows an
632analytical separation of agent and artifact. Both the affordance and structuration theory
633consider the influence of agent and artifact de facto as inseparable. This inseparability brings
634about methodological problems (Archer 1995). Influences of either the human agent or the
635technical artifact become empirically indistinguishable. The theory of instrumental genesis,
636in contrast, takes on a systems perspective: it describes the agent-artifact connection as a
637hierarchically organised system whereby each level in the hierarchy has distinct properties.
638This allows the connection to be decomposed and analysed accordingly: the behavioural
639scheme component and the artifact component can be distinguished - and decomposed
640further - from the activity under study, and so can individual and collective orientations in
641the activity.
642Conclusion
643So where does this leave us? The rationale of ‘mutual shaping’ of agent and artifact posits
644that the technical artifact shapes the learners’ behaviour, and that the learner shapes the
645technical artifact - or rather, the opportunities that are made available by it. Consequently,
646one has to take into account this mutual shaping. Each of the three positions we have
647discussed proposes a relational perspective whereby educational technology emerges from
648an interaction of learners and technical artifacts and is shaped by both. The challenge is to
649explain the establishment and coordination of this connection without unnecessarily priori-
650tising the influence of one over the other. In our view, of the three positions, instrumental
651genesis proposes the most viable approach to this challenge.
652Instrumental genesis allows a thorough description of how educational technology
653develops from the interaction of learners and technical artifacts. It acknowledges the
654influence of both the learners and the artifact - of both human behaviour and technical
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655content, without emphasizing one over the other. It allows one to describe in detail how the
656agent-artifact connection is established and subsequently managed among multiple collab-
657orating agents. The connection is seen as a hierarchically developed activity system that can
658be analytically separated. This developmental perspective is very useful for CSCL because
659distinct elements that constitute and influence the mediated learning activity can be assessed
660and used for purposes of design. For example:
661& On a personal dimension, the physical connection that each single learner entertains with
662the artifact, or the ability to reflect and make conscious choices based on personal needs,
663goals and expectations.
664& On a collective dimension, coordination and fine-tuning of the interaction with the
665artifact among multiple learners in order to achieve a common goal.
666& On a practice dimension, local norms and conventions that adhere to particular task-
667artifact configurations.
668For many CSCL studies it is relevant to ask to what extent learners’ actions are influenced
669by artifactual constraints and opportunities, and how pre-existing knowledge and experience
670come into play. For most studies it is relevant to analyze how groups organize and fine-tune
671their interaction with the artifact in order to collaborate. The theory of instrumental genesis
672allows such an analysis in a manner that is theoretically and methodologically grounded,
673whereas the other two relational positions do not.
674
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